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NOTES
CALIFORNIA v FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION: CONTINUING THE
STRUGGLE BETWEEN SECTIONS
151 AND 152 OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS ACT
Section 151 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (the Act),'
mandates that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commis-
sion) create a rapid and efficient nationwide telecommunication network. To
facilitate creation of this network, section 151 grants the Commission broad
jurisdiction over interstate communications. Section 152(b) of the Act,2
however, prohibits the Commission from exercising its jurisdiction with
respect to intrastate telecommunication matters.3 State regulators, in an
attempt to maintain exclusive regulatory control over intrastate telecommu-
nication networks and services, argue that section 152(b) effectively bans all
FCC regulation of intrastate communication matters. The states' position
has forced state public utility commissions (PUCs) and the FCC into a juris-
dictional battle over what the FCC can and cannot regulate. This jurisdic-
tional battle, in addition to delaying implementation of a fully unified
nationwide telecommunication infrastructure and preventing consumers' ac-
cess to all that communications technology can offer, has resulted in conflict-
ing interpretations among the federal courts of appeals regarding the scope
of the FCC's jurisdiction under the Communications Act. Courts have di-
1. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-301 (1988). Section 151 provides: "For the purposes of regulating
interstate and foreign commerce in communication... so as to make available... a rapid,
efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate
facilities at reasonable charges... there is created a Commission to be known as the 'Federal
Communications Commission.'" 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
2. Section 152(b) of the Communications Act provides: "[NMothing in this chapter shall
be construed to apply or to give the Commission jurisdiction with respect to ... charges,
classification, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate
communication service by wire or radio of any carrier .... " 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1988).
3. Id.
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vided on the question of whether the FCC, despite section 152(b), can pre-
empt state regulation of "enhanced services" pursuant to section 151.'
A series of decisions first issued by the Commission in reaction to phone
companies providing data processing services over their phone lines precipi-
tated this split in the circuits.' By the late 1960s, computers had grown so
sophisticated and useful that telecommunications common carriers began
using them to manage customer billing, accounting, marketing, and complex
switching and routing functions.6 Not suprisingly, the immense computers
used to switch and route calls during peak traffic periods provided the phone
companies with excess data processing capacity during off-peak hours.7 In
fact, the phone companies found it economically rewarding to purposefully
procure this surplus computer capacity and market it along with basic phone
8service.
When phone companies began increasing their data processing offerings9
the FCC became alarmed, fearing the companies would stifle competition in
the burgeoning data processing services industry and reduce the quality of
4. The Commission defines "enhanced services" as those services "offered over common
carrier transmission facilities used in interstate communications, which employ computer
processing applications that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the
subscriber's transmitted information; provide the subscriber additional, different, or restruc-
tured information; or involve subscriber interaction with stored information." 47 C.F.R.
§ 64.702 (1990). Services like Westlaw, LEXIS, and NEXIS are examples of "enhanced
services."
5. Comment, Interdependence of Communications and Data Processing: An Alternative
Proposal for the Second Computer Inquiry, 73 NW. U.L. REV. 307, 308 (1978); see also GTE
Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 726 (2nd Cir. 1973); Richard McKenna, Preemption Under
the Communications Act, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1986); Eli M. Noam, Federal and State
Roles in Telecommunications: The Effects of Deregulation, 36 VAND. L. REV. 949, 950 (1983);
Marilyn R. Stahl Note, Affordable Rates: The Case Against FCC Preemption of Telephone
Depreciation, 35 AM. U.L. REV. 517, 518 (1986).
6. See Comment, supra note 5, at 308.
7. Id. at 309; Noam, supra note 5, at 959.
8. Comment, supra note 5, at 307. The resale of excess computer capacity generated
over one half billion dollars in revenue for the phone companies during 1967. Id. (citing STAN-
DARD AND POOR'S INDUSTRY SURVEY, 0-13 (1977)).
9. The Commission stated:
mhe issues which raised basic concern in both the communications and computer
industries are those which relate to the nature and extent of the regulatory jurisdic-
tion and control which we intend to exercise over the furnishing of data processing
and communications services ... and the furnishing of data processing services by
communications common carriers.
Tentative Decision, Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of
Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 292 (1970) [hereinaf-
ter Computer I Tentative Decision]; Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971) [here-
inafter Computer I Final Decision], aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. GTE Serv. Corp.
v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2nd Cir. 1973).
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basic service."o Specifically, the Commission believed the phone companies
would subsidize their data processing activities with revenues from their ba-
sic service offerings, enabling them to offer data processing services at prices
far below those of any competitor. In 1966, the FCC began investigating the
regulatory and policy problems created when common carriers provided
data processing services. 1 From a regulatory perspective, the interrelated
computer and communication technologies made it nearly impossible for the
Commission to determine which common carrier provided services 2 were
subject to its regulation and which services were purely data processing serv-
ices and consequently beyond it's jurisdiction. 3 From a policy perspective,
the FCC had to reconcile its desire to respond to market forces and develop
a competitive enhanced services market with its obligation, under section
151, to ensure that the quality of basic telephone service did not decline as a
result of phone company entry into the data processing market. 4 Faced
10. See Computer I Final Decision, supra note 9, at 270. The FCC feared that common
carriers "engag[ed] in remote access data processing will be providing the communications
component of the service to themselves, as well as to their computer service competitors in the
same business. Here it is feared that carriers may favor their own interests and discriminate
against their competitors .... Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 9, at 299; see infra
note 20 and accompanying text.
11. The FCC indicated it wanted to address two basic policy and regulatory questions:
"(a) The nature and extent of the [FCC's] regulatory jurisdiction to be applied to data process-
ing services; and (b) Whether, under what circumstances, and subject to what conditions or
safeguards, common carriers should be permitted to engage in data processing." Computer I
Tentative Decision, supra note 9, at 295.
12. Comment, supra note 5, at 314 n.33. Data processing consists of
(1) input-the translation of information from human language into a language the
system can understand and entry of the information into the system; (2) process-
ing-the performance of logical operations and calculations on the information;
(3) storage-the commitment of the information to the system's information deposi-
tory; (4) output - the translation of information from machine to human language
and return of the information from the system; and (5) control-the control of the
time and order in which different parts of the system and the devices which contain
those parts perform the first four functions.
Id. (citing Brief for Petitioners at 7-8, IBM Corp. v. FCC, 570 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1978)).
13. Robert M. Frieden, The Computer Inquiries: Mapping the Communications/Informa-
tion Processing Terrain, 33 FED. COMM. L.J. 55 (1981); see infra note 21 and accompanying
text.
14. Frieden, supra note 13, at 56. In its Computer I Final Decision, the FCC concluded
that
[T]here is a close and intimate relationship between data processing and communica-
tions services.... [W]ithout appropriate regulatory safeguards, the provision of data
processing services by common carriers could adversely affect the statutory obliga-
tion of such carriers to provide adequate communication services . . .and impair
effective competition in the sale of data processing services.
Supra note 9, at 269.
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with these regulatory and policy dilemmas, the FCC commenced a series of
rulemaking proceedings.
In Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of
Computer and Communication Services and Facilities (Computer I), 5 the
first rulemaking specifically addressing common carrier provision of en-
hanced services, the Commission distinguished regulated and unregulated
communication services on the basis of the function or functions the com-
puter performed.' 6 For example, if the computer simply transmitted unal-
tered messages between two or more points using communication facilities,' 7
the Commission deemed the service a communication service subject to fed-
eral regulation.'" If the computer processed the information, such as storing
or retrieving data "according to programmed instructions,"' 19 the FCC
deemed the service a non-regulated data processing service, even though
communication lines delivered the processing results.2" To prevent anti-
competitive cross-subsidization, the Commission also developed structural
separation requirements which forced the phone companies to offer their en-
hanced services through a separate corporate subsidiary. 2'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in GTE Ser-
vice Corp. v. FCC,22 upheld the Computer I orders. The court held that the
FCC possessed the authority to regulate common carrier provision of en-
hanced services pursuant to section 151 of the Act.23 The court stated that
even absent explicit reference to computer services in the Act, the expansive
power of the Commission included the jurisdictional authority to regulate
common carrier activities in an area as intimately related to communications
15. Notice of Inquiry, 7 F.C.C.2d 11 (1966); Supplemental Notice of Inquiry, 7 F.C.C.2d
19 (1967); Report and Further Notice of Inquiry, 17 F.C.C.2d 587 (1969); Tentative Decision,
28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970); Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part sub nor. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2nd Cir. 1973).
16. Computer I Final Decision, supra note 9, at 287.
17. Id.
18. Id.; see Frieden, supra note 13, at 65; Comment, supra note 5, at 311.
19. Computer I Final Decision, supra note 9, at 287.
20. Id.
21. The Commission reasoned that forcing common carriers to market and sell enhanced
services separately from basic services would ensure
a) that such [provision of enhanced] services [would] not adversely affect the provi-
sion of efficient and economic common carrier services; b) that the costs related to
the furnishing of such services [would] not be passed on, directly or indirectly, to the
users of common carrier services; c) that revenues derived from common carrier
services [would] not be used to subsidize any data processing services; and d) that
the furnishing of such services [would] not inhibit free and fair competition between
communications common carriers and data processing companies ....
Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 9, at 302.
22. 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973).
23. Id. at 730-31; see supra note 1.
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as that of computerized data processing services, especially where provision
of these services could affect provision of reasonably priced basic communi-
24cation services.
By the late 1970s, developments in communication technology made it
increasingly difficult for the FCC, using Computer Ps definitions, to deter-
mine whether a service was a communication service or a data processing
service.25 Consequently, in 1980, the Commission commenced its Second
Computer Inquiry (Computer /J).26
In Computer 11, the Commission simplified Computer I's distinctions be-
tween regulated and non-regulated services by dividing all information
processing and telecommunication services into two categories: "basic
transmission services" and "enhanced services.",2' The FCC concluded
24. 474 F.2d at 730.
25. McKenna, supra note 5, at 66 (quoting Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 9,
at 304).
26. Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, Amendment of Section 64.702 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations, 61 F.C.C.2d 103 (1976) [hereinafter Computer II Notice
of Inquiry]; Supplemental Notice of Inquiry and Enlargement of Proposed Rulemaking,
Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Supplemental No-
tice), 64 F.C.C.2d 771 (1977); Tentative Decision and Further Notice of Inquiry and Rulemak-
ing, Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Tentative
Decision), 72 F.C.C.2d 358 (1979); Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) [hereinafter Com-
puter II Final Decision], modified on reconsideration, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 84
F.C.C.2d 50 (1980), further reconsideration, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Further Re-
consideration, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981) [hereinafter Computer II Further Reconsideration Or-
der], aff'd sub nom. Computer & Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C.
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983).
27. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 26, at 387.
28. Id. In Computer II, the FCC concluded that, as opposed to basic voice and transmis-
sion service, enhanced services were not the kind of "general public offerings" defined as com-
mon carriage in National Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976) (NARUC I). The FCC reasoned that inherent in
providing an enhanced service is the ability and practice of vendors to tailor their service to
meet the customer's particularized need. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 26, at 389.
The FCC felt that this characteristic of enhanced services distinguished them from basic
services.
In United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), the Supreme Court held
that the FCC could assert jurisdiction over activities which were not within the reach of Title
II regulation but were "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's
various responsibilities." Id at 178; see also supra note 5.
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that because enhanced services were not common carrier offerings, 29 they
were exempt from common carrier regulation.3 °
PUCs around the country challenged Computer II, arguing that the Com-
mission's deregulation had impermissibly preempted state regulation.3 Spe-
cifically, the PUCs contended that section 152(b) of the Act reserved
authority to regulate intrastate communication matters to the states, and
that by restricting the states to enacting only those regulations entirely con-
sistent with Computer 11, the Commission invaded the states' sphere of au-
thority. 32 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, in Computer & Communications Industry Ass'n v. FCC (CCIA),33
read section 151 of the Act expansively and decided that the Commission
had correctly exercised its regulatory authority pursuant to section 151 of
the Act and had not, as the states contended, invaded the states' sphere of
29. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 26, at 428-29. Section 153(h) of the Commu-
nications Act defines "common carrier" as "any person engaged as a common carrier for hire,
in interstate or foreign communications by wire or radio." 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1988). The
Act's language does not shed much light on the definition or status of a common carrier, but
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in National Ass'n of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners v. FCC (NARUC I), 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
992 (1976), held that a common carrier is something that holds itself out indiscriminately to
the public for hire and transmits information exactly as it is given to it by the client. Id. at
640-42. The court distinguished a common carrier from an entity that "make[s] individual-
ized decisions, in particular cases, whether and on what terms to deal." Id. at 641; see Wold
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 1465, 1471 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (pointing to this
distinction as central to the concept of a "common carrier"). Shortly after NAR UC I, the FCC
adopted the court's definition of common carrier as determinative of common carrier status
under the Communications Act. See Report and Order, Regulatory Policies Concerning Re-
sale and Shared Use of Common Carrier Services and Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261, 308 (1976).
For additional information on the development of the concept of common carrier, see M.
HALE, THE ANALYSIS OF LAW (1713) (scholars attribute Lord Hale with articulating the
concept of a private right affected by a public interest). See also Phil Nichols, Note, Redefining
Common Carrier: The FCC's Attempt at Deregulation by Redefinition, 1987 DUKE L.J. 501.
30. Although the Commission opened the enhanced services market to competition, Com-
puter II retained Computer 's structural separation requirements. See also infra text accom-
panying notes 189-93.
31. Computer & Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983). State regulators had four arguments. First, they contended
that the Commission had mistakenly concluded that it could forbear from regulating CPE and
enhanced services. Second, they argued that the Commission, while deregulating the provision
of enhanced services, had erroneously preempted inconsistent state regulation. Third, they
alleged that the "maximum separation" requirement should have been imposed on other carri-
ers besides AT&T. Finally, the parties argued that the Commission had based its maximum
separation decision on a misinterpretation of the 1956 Consent Decree. Id. at 206.
32. Id. at 209.
33. 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983).
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authority.34 The court thereupon upheld the FCC's preemption of all incon-
sistent state regulation of enhanced services.35
In 1986, after concluding that evolving competition in the enhanced serv-
ices market had rendered its Computer I and Computer II separate corporate
subsidiary requirements obsolete,36 the Commission commenced its Third
Computer Inquiry (Computer III).3" In Computer III, the FCC retained
Computer I1s definition as well as its deregulation of enhanced services,
thereby maintaining FCC preemption of any inconsistent state regulation.3 s
The FCC went a step further than it had in Computer II, however, and
eliminated the structural separation requirements for the Bell Operating
Companies (BOCs), permitting them to offer enhanced services on an inte-
grated basis. 39 State PUCs challenged Computer 111," contending, just as
34. Id. at 214-18.
35. Id.
36. The enhanced services market is increasing by 20 percent per year. See Petition for
Declaratory Ruling That States and the District of Columbia Are Preempted From Imposing
Entry and Exit Regulation and Tariff Requirements on Carrier Affiliated and Noncarrier Affil-
iated Enhanced Service Providers 3 (FCC filed Feb 1, 1991) (later withdrawn).
37. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's
Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), 50 Fed. Reg. 33,581 (1985); Report and
Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) [hereinafter Computer III Phase I Order], modified on recon-
sideration, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 2 F.C.C.R. 3035 (1987)
[hereinafter Computer III Phase I Reconsideration Order], further reconsideration, Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order on Further Reconsideration, 3 F.C.C.R. 1135 (1988), second further
reconsideration, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Further Reconsideration and Second
Further Reconsideration, 4 F.C.C.R. 5927 (1989), Phase I Order and Phase I Reconsideration
Order, vacated sub nom. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990); Report and Order,
2 F.C.C.R. 3072 (1987) [hereinafter Computer III Phase II Order], reconsideration, Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 3 F.C.C.R. 1150 (1988), further reconsideration,
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Further Reconsideration and Second Further Reconsid-
eration, 4 F.C.C.R. 5927 (1989); see infra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
38. Computer III Phase I Order, supra note 37, at 1127-28. Computer III actually con-
sists of six orders. See supra note 37.
39. See Computer III Phase I Order, supra note 37, at 1126-28; Computer III Phase I
Reconsideration Order, supra note 37, at 3061-63; Computer III Phase II Order, supra note
37, at 3100-02. In particular, Computer III precluded states from "(1) tariffing enhanced serv-
ices sold by communications carriers; (2) requiring communications carriers to maintain
structural separation between their basic and enhanced service operations; and (3) requiring
nonstructural safeguards that are inconsistent with or more stringent than the FCC's struc-
tural safeguards." California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1239 (9th Cir. 1990).
Pursuant to Computer III, AT&T and the BOCs could offer enhanced and basic services on
an integrated basis after implementing Computer IIs non-structural safeguards-comparably
efficient interconnection (CEI) and open network architecture (ONA). See Computer III
Phase I Order, supra note 37, at 960.
40. 905 F.2d at 1239.
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they had in CCIA, that FCC preemption of state regulation of enhanced
services violated section 152(b) of the Act.4
In California v. FCC,4 2 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit vacated and remanded the Computer III Order maintaining Com-
puter IFs deregulation of enhanced services.43 The court evaluated the
meaning and scope of section 152(b), 44 stating that section 152(b) did not
distinguish between regulated and unregulated communications services
based on the nature of the services, but rather between providers of the serv-
ices.45 The court thereupon concluded that states could regulate enhanced
services.46 After acknowledging that the Supreme Court had created an
"impossibility exception" to section 152(b)'s ban on FCC control of intra-
state communication matters,4 the court decided that the Computer III Or-
ders did not qualify under the exception because they were not narrowly
tailored to preempt only those state regulations which would necessarily
thwart and impede valid FCC goals.48 The court thereupon invalidated the
FCC's preemption of state regulation of enhanced services.49
41. Id. State PUCs also argued that allowing the BOCs to integrate their regulated and
non-regulated activities was an arbitrary and capricious decision in violation of section 10(e) of
the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 1230.
42. 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990).
43. Id. at 1246. The Computer III decisions before the court were the Phase I Order,
Phase I Reconsideration Order, and Phase H Order. 905 F.2d at 1223 n. i.
The court devotes the first part of its opinion to discussing the arbitrary and capricious
claim. As background, fourteen months before issuing the Computer III Phase I Order al-
lowing the BOCs to offer enhanced services on an integrated basis, the FCC mandated struc-
tural separation for the BOCs. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Policy and Rules Concerning
the Furnishing of Customer Premises Equipment, Enhanced Services and Cellular Communi-
cations Services by the Bell Operating Companies, 93 F.C.C.2d 722 (1983); Report and Order,
95 F.C.C.2d 1117 (1983) [hereinafter BOC Separation Order], aff'd sub nom. Illinois Bell Tel.
Co. v. FCC, 740 F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1984).
In the BOC Separation Order, the FCC stressed that the BOCs exercised the same monopoly
power through their ownership of the local exchanges that AT&T exercised and, therefore, the
BOCs could not offer enhanced services on an integrated basis. 95 F.C.C.2d at 1138-39. The
FCC noted that structural separation was necessary to protect the integrity of the two markets:
the unregulated market for enhanced services and the regulated market for basic telephone
services. Id. at 1132-37. Because structural separation would effectively preclude the BOC's
from cross-subsidizing their own enhanced services and discriminating against the enhanced
service offerings of their competitors, the Commission believed structural separations would
ensure that free and fair competition would flourish in the budding enhanced services industry.
Id.
44. 905 F.2d at 1239.
45. Id. at 1239-40.
46. Id. at 1242.
47. Id. at 1240.
48. Id. at 1243-44.
49. Id. at 1245.
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This Note focuses on the scope of the Commission's section 151 jurisdic-
tion as decided in California v. FCC. This Note begins by analyzing the
scope of federal and state jurisdiction over telecommunications, both prior to
and following the passage of the Communications Act. It next analyzes the
development and application of a two-prong preemption test with which
courts have upheld FCC preemption for two decades. It then analyzes the
preemption test articulated in California v. FCC, focusing on the Ninth Cir-
cuit's requirement that the Commission meet a higher standard of proof
than even the Supreme Court requires. Finally, this Note discusses the im-
pact which California v. FCC's more demanding preemption test is having
and will have on the Commission's pro-competitive telecommunication pol-
icy. This Note concludes by asserting that the Ninth Circuit's preemption
test, by placing a greater evidentiary burden on the Commission when it tries
to preempt state telecommunication regulation, severely constrains the Com-
mission in its attempt to fulfill section 15 1's congressional mandate to create
a rapid and efficient nationwide telecommunication network. Thus, this de-
cision appears to set the stage for an endless jurisdictional war between the
states and the FCC, a war whose casualties will be the American phone
customer who may simply have to do without the most advanced telecom-
munications services and technology.
I. HISTORIC DIVISION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATORY
AUTHORITY
A. Pre-1934: Regulation by Default
Prior to 1934,50 state public utility commissions regulated intrastate tele-
phone networks and services with little or no interference from the federal
government, 51 and the Bell system, primary owner and operator of the inter-
state telephone network, actually opposed federal government regulation.52
50. The independent telephone industry was born in 1893 when the Bell System patents
for the telephone handset expired. Richard Gabel, The Early Competitive Era in Telephone
Communication, 1893-1920, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 340, 341 (1969). The independents
focused on connecting the rural areas, which until then had been areas ignored by the Bell
System. Id. at 344. In fact, it was only after the Bell patents expired that service reached rural
areas for the first time. Id. at 345.
51. Stahl, Note, supra note 5, at 520-21; Noam, supra note 5, at 954.
52. G. Hamilton Loeb, The Communication Act Policy Toward Competition: A Failure to
Communicate, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1, 6. When the Bell patents expired in 1893-94, small in-
dependent companies used the telephone technology to compete with the Bell system. Id. at 5.
Although AT&T began acquiring these competitive local phone companies, competition re-
mained stiff and largely unchecked by federal control. Id. at 6. See Dean Birch, Common
Carrier Communication by Wire and Radio: A Retrospective, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 85, 86-87
(1985) (noting that only the Kingsbury Commitment stopped AT&T aquisition of the in-
dependents). But see Gabel, supra note 50, at 355. Prior to 1934, the federal courts indirectly
1991]
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The Bell system's attitude changed, however, when the small, and independ-
ent phone companies began connecting across state lines and threatening its
market-share, forcing the Bell system to lower its prices.53 In an attempt to
protect their investment, bankers and other businessmen investing in the Bell
system appealed for federal assistance in stablizing and normalizing these
competitive forces.54 When the local networks began crossing state lines,
and interconnecting with the Bell system's interstate network, 55 the purely
intrastate character of communication facilities began to disappear, 56 plac-
ing the interstate portion of the network within the sphere of federal regula-
tory power.5'
regulated the burgeoning phone system by utilizing the Fourteenth Amendment as a means of
authority to guide rate-setting bodies. Id.
53. Gabel, supra note 50, at 355.
54. Id. The Morgan banking group, which supported the Bell system financially, wanted
the "stability and rationality of operations" that a purely competitive system could not
guarantee.
55. Bruce N. Graham, Note, Administrative Agencies - Separating the Jurisdictional Au-
thorities of State and Federal Administrators in the Regulation of the Physical Equipment
Within the Nation's Telephone Network, North Carolina Utilities Comm'n v. Federal Commu-
nications Comm'n, 537 F.2d 787, cert. denied, 97S. Ct. 651 (1976), 8 U. TOL. L. REV. 733,
736-37 (1977).
56. Id. In the late 1880s, state regulators facilitated the development of a national tele-
phone network by awarding easements across state lands and "awarding exclusive service
franchises to companies that agreed to serve local communities." Id. at 735 (footnote omit-
ted). Companies like AT&T then sold these franchises to local investors who, in turn, erected
the local network and operated the switching facilities. Id. at 735 n.10. AT&T subjected the
franchises to various conditions, such as requiring that only AT&T-made equipment be used
within the networks. Id.
State public utility commissions exercised jurisdiction over those burgeoning phone compa-
nies operating within their state. Id. at 735-36. The states justified their regulation as a valid
exercise of their police powers to guarantee "that perceived benefits of the telephone could be
enjoyed by the general public." Id. (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court approved state
regulation of the telephone companies in Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles,
211 U.S. 265 (1908). Graham, Note, supra note 55, at 736 n. 12. It was under this control and
assistance of the state commissions that local telephone companies were able to flourish and
create the infrastructure of an interstate network. Id. As an example of this new infrastruc-
ture, in 1880, Boston and Providence Rhode Island were connected; Boston and New York
were connected in 1884; New York and San Francisco were connected in 1915. Id. at 736
n.13.
57. See Graham, Note, supra note 55, at 737. It appears that even though the once local
networks were developing interstate characteristics, few regulators or courts stressed that the
interstate portions of these networks and facilities were subject to federal control. The courts
seemed only concerned with the antitrust, tax and corporate matters of AT&T, leaving ques-
tions about the regulatory status of the actual facilities to the states. Id. at 737 n.14. For
example, in 1913, the Justice Department and AT&T entered into an agreement known as the
Kingsbury Commitment wherein AT&T, in an effort to avoid being the subject of a DOJ
antitrust suit, agreed to divest Western Union (which it had acquired in 1909), interconnect
independent lines with its long distance lines and stop buying and acquiring control of in-
[Vol. 40:893
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In 1910, the federal government brought the communications industry,
such as it was, under federal regulatory supervision by passing the Mann-
Elkins Act.5 8 The Mann-Elkins Act, an amendment to the Interstate Com-
merce Act of 1887, vested the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) with
broad jurisdiction over interstate rates charged by "telegraph, telephone and
cable companies."59 Whether and to what extent the ICC had jurisdiction
over intrastate rates remained unclear until a 1914 Supreme Court decision
prompted state regulators to demand that Congress enact legislation ex-
pressly limiting the ICC's authority to regulating only the interstate portion
of the network.'
In Houston, East and West Railway Co. v. United States,61 commonly re-
ferred to as the Shreveport Rate Case, the Supreme Court upheld the ICC's
authority to set intrastate railroad shipping rates when those rates were "in-
juriously affecting, through an unreasonable discrimination, traffic that was
interstate."'62 By upholding the ICC's authority to regulate what appeared
to be a primarily intrastate matter,6 3 the Shreveport decision alarmed state
telephone regulators. 64 State regulators saw their authority over the rail-
dependent phone companies "operating in the same market as Bell system subsidiaries." Loeb,
supra note 52, at 6.
58. Commerce Court (Mann-Elkins) Act, Pub. L. No. 218, ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 544
(1910) (amending Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.)).
59. Mann-Elkins Act, Pub. L. No. 218, ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 544. The primary purpose of
the amendment, however, seems to have been to expand the ICC's control over the railroads.
Commentators note that reference to telecommunications matters was made in a somewhat
off-hand manner. See Loeb, supra note 52, at 6.
60. Even after acquiring control over interstate phone rates, the ICC still concentrated
most of its attention on regulating the railroads. Graham, Note, supra note 55 at 738. Once
the ICC began focusing its attention on the interstate phone network, however, it began decid-
ing cases based on an ever-broadening interpretation of its authority under the Mann-Elkins
Act. See, e.g., Private Wire Contracts, 50 I.C.C. 731, 757 (1918) (deciding private telephone
lines were part of the interstate telephone network); Huntington Eng'g Co. v. Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co., 112 I.C.C. 377, 379 (1926) (asserting that security deposits for telephone
service were part of interstate commerce and were therefore subject to ICC regulation).
61. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
62. Id. at 358. The Texas Railroad Commission had established a system of setting intra-
state rates which were lower than ICC-established rates, thereby discriminating against inter-
state shippers in favor of Texas shippers. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Noam, supra note 5, at 954. The Shreveport decision solidified federal dominance
over state railroad regulation. "By analogy to the Shreveport cases, the states' authority in the
telephone area became tenuous; the states ultimately were only as powerful as the ICC allowed
.... " Id; see also John R. Haring & Kathleen B. Levitz, The Law and Economics of Federal-
ism in Telecommunications, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 261, 292 (1988-89) (noting that state regula-
tors feared that unless Congress expressly limited the ICC's authority over intrastate phone
rates, the states would only have nominal control over intrastate networks and service. For
additional background on the pivotal Shreveport decision and its effects, see Coleman, The
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roads diminish in Shreveport65 and were concerned that the same would
happen to their authority over the intrastate telephone network.66 Although
the ICC did not immediately issue a Shreveport-type decision affecting tele-
phone rates, state regulators feared a growing federal presence in the tele-
phone field 67 and lobbied Congress for legislation expressly limiting the
ICC's jurisdiction to interstate matters, thereby preserving state control over
the intrastate portion of the phone network.6"
B. Post-1934: A Co-Regulatory Scheme
In February 1934, President Roosevelt proposed creating a single agency
in which the existing authority of the ICC, Federal Radio Commision and
Postmaster General would be consolidated. 69 Because the Roosevelt Ad-
ministration essentially requested that regulatory authority over communi-
cations be centralized rather than changed, "Congress indicated its intent to
Evolution of Federal Regulation of Intrastate Rates: The Shreveport Rate Cases, 28 HARV. L.
REv. 34 (1914) (criticizing the court's decision).
65. Haring & Levitz, supra note 64, at 292.
66. Id.
67. As if fulfilling the state regulator's prophecy, the ICC rendered an expansionist read-
ing of the Mann-Elkins Act in Telephone & Railroad Depreciation Charges, 118 I.C.C. 377
(1926). See Graham, Note, supra note 55, at 740. The decision involved the ICC's attempt to
mandate a uniform system of depreciation for telephone equipment. The states argued that
this aspect of the telephone business was beyond the ICC's jurisdiction because the states had
always regulated costs associated with telephone equipment. 118 I.C.C. at 378. The ICC
rejected the states' argument and concluded that setting a uniform system of depreciation was
within its powers, just as it was within its power to set local shipping rates for the railroads.
Id.
In 1931, the Supreme Court upheld ICC jurisdiction over interstate telephone service in
Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930), conformed to, Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v.
Gilbert, 3 F. Supp. 595 (D. Ill. 1933), rev'd sub nom. Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292
U.S. 151 (1934). The Illinois public utility commission issued an order prescribing rates for
Illinois Bell. Id. at 135. Illinois Bell then obtained an order from the federal district court
enjoining enforcement of the rates. Id. The Supreme Court ultimately remanded the matter.
Id. at 148. In deciding to remand, the Court stressed the importance of "the appropriate
recognition of the competent governmental authority in each field of regulation." Id. The
Court held that Illinois Bell's interstate service was within the ICC's jurisdiction although its
intrastate service was within the state's jurisdiction. Id. at 149.
68. Graham, Note, supra note 55, at 740.
69. See President Roosevelt's Message to Congress Recommending that Congress Create
a New Agency to be Known as the Federal Communications Commission, Feb. 26, 1934,
reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1-2 (1934). Although the ICC
controlled the telephone network prior to the enactment of the Communications Act in 1934,
the Federal Radio Commission regulated the country's radio network. 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
See Comment, Federal Control of Radio Broadcasting, 39 YALE L.J. 245 (1929). Scholars
agree, however, that the Radio Commission was ineffective at best, having "failed to live up to
congressional expectations." Graham, Note, supra note 55, at 744.
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change the forum, but generally not the content, of federal regulatory au-
thority, over communications."'7
During the debates surrounding the passage of the Act, the National As-
sociation of Regulatory Commissions (NARUC), an association of state
PUCs, requested that language be included in the Act to prevent the ICC
from applying the Shreveport rationale to the telephone industry.71 NARUC
argued that Congress should expressly limit the jurisdiction of the newly
created Commission to prevent it from preempting state regulation of intra-
state telephone matters as the ICC had done in the railroad industry.72 Lob-
bying efforts resulted in the inclusion of section 152(b) in the
Communications Act.73 By its plain language, section 152(b) prohibits the
Commission from regulating "charges, classifications, practices, services, fa-
cilities, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate communication
service by wire or radio of any carrier ... ."' By carving out a sphere of
70. Matthew S. Bewig, Federalism and Telecommunications: On the Right Wavelength?
59 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1190, 1193 (1991) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1934)), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, at 99
(1989) (noting that "[t]he bill is largely based upon existing legislation and except for the
change of administrative authority does not vary greatly change or add to existing laws"). But
see Loeb, supra note 52, at 20-22 (discussing subtle differences between authority of the FCC
under the Communications Act and the authority of the ICC under the Mann-Elkins Act).
71. McKenna, supra note 5, at 9.
72. Graham, Note, supra note 55, at 745. John Benton, a state commission lobbyist, ex-
pressed the state regulators' fear of the Shreveport rationale being applied to telephone regula-
tion in his 1943 congressional testimony:
The Interstate Commerce Commission has the same power now to override State
regulation in the telephone field as it has in the railroad field, although in the railroad
field more than 85 percent of the business is interstate, while in the telephone field
less than 2 percent of telephone messages are interstate.... Unless the Congress
wishes to bring control of local telephone business, which is now subject to State
regulation under the domination of the [Federal Communications Commission], it
cannot merely transfer the existing power of the Interstate Commerce Commission to
this new commission. It must describe the field within which the new commission
shall operate.
Hearings on H.R. 8301 Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 135-36 (1934).
73. Bewig, supra note 70, at 1194; see also McKenna, supra note 5, at 13 (noting that the
bills introduced in 1934 were meant to create a "scheme of dual regulation that negated the
Shreveport doctrine"); Computer & Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 216
n.99 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting congressional intent in adopting section 152(b) of the Act to
prevent application of Shreveport doctrine in telecommunications), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938
(1983); Telerent Leasing Corp., 45 F.C.C. 2d 204 (1974), aff'd sub nom. North Carolina Util.
Comm'n. v. FCC (NCUC I), 537 F.2d 787, 793 n.6 (4th Cir.) (refering to congressional reports
which supported their argument that section 152(b) of the Act was meant to prevent a Shreve-
port-type decision in telecommunications), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976); Sablowsky v.
United States, 101 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1938) (interpreting section 152(b) as being designed to
allow the FCC jurisdiction over all interstate and foreign communication).
74. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1988).
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regulatory jurisdiction for the states in section 152(b), Congress created a
dual regulatory scheme under which the states and the FCC would ulti-
mately find themselves on opposite sides of the regulatory fence.75
During the decades immediately following the passage of the Act, both
federal and state agencies concurrently regulated the same facilities. 76 Few
jurisdictional conflicts arose because both federal and state regulatory bodies
shared the same goals." Both the FCC and state regulatory agencies agreed
that local rates should remain low, that long-distance customers should con-
tribute to the costs of the local network and that telephone monopolies were
necessary. 78
This cooperative system began to crumble, however, when federal and
state regulatory goals diverged. The Commission began embracing concepts
of market efficiency and competition, 79 while the states continued emphasiz-
ing cross-subsidies, low rates and consumer-oriented regulation. 0 In fact,
state regulators objected to competition, fearing it would upset the system of
cross-subsidies which had kept local telephone rates low and customers com-
placent.8 Viewing competition as the guarantor of a truly rapid, efficient
and nationwide communications network, the FCC, despite resistance from
75. McKenna, supra note 5, at 13; see also Graham, Note, supra note 55, at 747. In
addition to section 152(b), 221(b) also prohibits the FCC from regulating specific intrastate
matters. In particular, section 221(b) provides:
[Niothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply, or to give the Commission
jurisdiction, with respect to charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or
regulations for or in connection with.., telephone exchange service .... even though
a portion of such exchange service constitutes interstate or foreign communication,
in any case where such matters are subject to regulation by a State commission or by
a local government authority.
47 U.S.C. § 221(b) (1988). Commentators note that this separation between the intrastate and
interstate portions of a telephone service or facility occurs at the exchange level per section
221(b). Graham, Note, supra note 55, at 747. In effect, facilities on the subscriber's side of the
local exchange facility were considered intrastate while facilities located between the local ex-
changes and which crossed state lines were considered interstate. Id.
76. Bewig, supra note 70, at 1196; see also Haring and Levitz, supra note 64, at 293 (not-
ing that state and federal regulators engaged in a co-regulatory scheme in which both shared
the responsibility of developing and maintaining a national telecommunications network).
77. Id. The FCC's regulatory philosophy was the same as that of the states. Both had
made a "commitment to universal service, affordable rates to residential subscribers, and a
unified national network based on the integrity of AT&T." Noam, supra note 5, at 956.
78. Bewig, supra note 70, at 1196.
79. Noam, supra note 5, at 956; Bewig, supra note 70, at 1196 (describing the deteriora-
tion of the cooperative regulatory system as the FCC began embracing competition and pre-
empting prohibitive state regulations).
80. Noam, supra note 5, at 956.
81. McKenna, supra note 5, at 4.
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the states, began preempting state regulations which it felt stifled
competition. 
2
II. DEVELOPMENT OF A PREEMPTION TEST UNDER THE
COMMUNICATIONS ACT
A. General Preemption Principles
The doctrine of preemption stems from the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution. 3 The federal government may preempt state
law in one of three ways. 4 First, Congress may explicitly state its intent to
82. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the FCC began introducing competition in several
markets, such as customer premise equipment (CPE) and data processing services. See Use of
the Carterphone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (forbidding
prohibitions against attachments of non-AT&T equipment and discouraging competitive entry
into the telephone equipment market), aff'd on rehearing, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968); North Car-
olina Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir.) (upholding FCC decision to preempt state
regulation of the interconnection of customer phone equipment), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027
(1976); Computer & Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(upholding FCC decision to preempt state regulation of enhanced services), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 938 (1983). Although this Note focuses on the FCC's procompetitive policy in the CPE
and enhanced services markets, the Commission introduced competition in several other areas.
See, e.g., Above 890 MHz, 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959) (authorizing private microwave systems),
recon. denied, 29 F.C.C. 825 (1960); Applications of Microwave Communications, Inc. (MCI),
18 F.C.C. 2d 953 (1969) (allowing, for the first time, a new entrant in facilities-based services
market), recon. denied, 21 F.C.C.2d 190 (1970); First Report and Order, Domestic Communi-
cations - Satellite Facilities, 22 F.C.C.2d 86 (1970) (insisting on competitive entry in the new
domestic satellite industry); Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Consideration of
Applications to Provide Specialized Common Carrier Services in the Domestic Public Point-
to-Point Microwave Radio Service, 29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1978) (establishing general policy en-
couraging new entry in commercial private line market), recon. denied, 44 F.C.C.2d 467
(1973), aff'd sub nom. Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission v. FCC, 513 F.2d
1142 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975).
83. The Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land... any Thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
84. In 1985 Justice Thurgood Marshall, for a unanimous Court, summarized the three-
part preemption analysis as follows:
It is a familiar and well-established principle that the Supremacy Clause invali-
dates state laws that "interfere with, or are contrary to," federal law. Under the
Supremacy Clause, federal law may supersede state law in several different ways.
First, when acting within constitutional limits, Congress is empowered to pre-empt
state law by so stating in express terms. In the absence of express pre-emptive lan-
guage, Congress' intent to pre-empt all state law in a particular area may be inferred
where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reason-
able the inference that Congress "left no room" for supplementary state regulation.
Pre-emption of a whole field also will be inferred where the field is one in which "the
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preempt state action."5 Second, courts may imply congressional intent to
preempt state action where federal legislation completely occupies a given
field.8 6 Finally, preemption may be implied where the state action would
actually conflict with the federal law or its purposes. 7 Under this third test,
state law is preempted if compliance with both federal and state law is im-
possible or if the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.""8
Preemption analysis begins with a determination of Congress' intent in
enacting or deciding not to enact a statute.8 9 Because Congress rarely ex-
presses an intent to preempt,90 states and the courts must often infer con-
gressional intent by looking to the legislation's terms, history and
objectives. 9
In 1982, the Supreme Court further held that federal agency regulations
have the same preemptive effect as federal statutes.92 The Court explained
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject."
Even where Congress has not completely displaced state regulation in a specific
area, state law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law.
Such a conflict arises when "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility" or when state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712-13 (1985)
(citations omitted). See generally WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
346 (5th ed. 1980) (defining preemption as the effect of federal legislation which restricts state
power).
85. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
86. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
87. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
88. Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)); see also Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409
(1986) (barring enforcement of Mississippi rule which undermined congressional objective of
allowing market forces to determine supply and demand for gas); McDermitt v. Wisconsin,
228 U.S. 115 (1913) (barring enforcement of Wisconsin regulation because impossible to com-
ply with both state and federal syrup-labelling rules).
89. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982); see also Flor-
ida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (Congress will be deemed to
have preempted an area where either intent is unmistakable or where nature of the regulated
subject matter permits no other conclusion).
90. See Stahl, note, supra Note 5, at 527.
91. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 232-36 (1947) (ascertaining federal
intent to preempt after looking at legislative history and language); Union Brokerage Co. v.
Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 203-06 (1944) (examining history of federal regulation in a particular
area to ascertain whether state authority must yield to federal control); see also Kenneth L.
Hirsch, Toward A New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515; Note, Pre-emption
as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959).
92. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 153.
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that when a state challenges an agency's regulation, the issue is whether the
agency was acting within its delegated authority when it enacted the
regulation. 93
B. Preemption Prompted By Competition
In its 1968 decision, Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tele-
phone Service,94 the Commission, for the first time, used section 151 as the
basis for preempting state regulations. In Carterfone, the Commission
decided that a common carrier could not refuse interconnection for a cus-
tomer-provided mobile radio-telephone device.95 Outraged, phone compa-
nies and state PUCs argued that non-carrier provided equipment would
jeopardize the integrity of the national network and competition would sig-
nificantly increase the price for basic services.96 The PUCs also argued that
the FCC could not assert jurisdiction over customer premises equipment
(CPE) interconnection because section 152(b) of the Act denied the FCC
authority over intrastate matters, and, according to the states, CPE intercon-
nection was clearly an intrastate matter.
97
Private telephone equipment manufacturers petitioned the FCC to rule
that state PUCs, like those in North Carolina and North Dakota which had
issued rulings banning interconnection of CPE to their respective intrastate
phone networks, could not restrict or regulate the interconnection of CPE in
any way that conflicted with FCC regulations. 98 The manufacturers argued
that such attempts to regulate or restrict interconnection were preempted by
the FCC's Carterfone decision.99
93. Id.
94. 13 F.C.C.2d 420, aff'd on rehearing, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968).
95. Note, Competition in the Telephone Equipment Industry: Beyond Telerent, 86 YALE
L.J. 538, 541 (1977). In so doing, the Commission finally adopted the District of Columbia
Circuit's 1956 decision in Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir.
1956). In Hush-A-Phone, the court held for the first time that phone subscribers could attach
equipment to their phones as long as the attachment did not harm the public network. 238
F.2d at 268.
96. Note, supra note 95, at 548. At best, state commissions and AT&T had weak argu-
ments. By requiring customers to install an interface mechanism before interconnecting their
non-carrier provided equipment, the Commission guaranteed the network's technical integrity.
Furthermore, the prediction that competition in the CPE market would raise prices because
the phone companies would subsidize their basic telephone rates with revenues from their
equipment sale was sharply criticized as lacking any evidence. Id.
97. Id.
98. Telerent Leasing Corp., 45 F.C.C.2d 204, 220 (1974), aff'd sub nom. North Carolina
Util. Comm'n. v. FCC (NCUC I), 537 F.2d 787, 790 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027
(1976).
99. Telerent Leasing, 45 F.C.C.2d at 207-09.
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The Commission responded to the North Carolina and North Dakota
bans on CPE interconnection by preempting the ruling and setting forth
"terms and conditions" governing CPE interconnection in Telerent Leasing
Corp."o Because telephone equipment is "used for both local and long dis-
tance telephone calls,"' ' the Commission reasoned that state regulations
prohibiting interconnection affected interstate as well as intrastate service.
The FCC then concluded it could preempt because these state regulations
conflicted with the FCC's section 151 plenary authority over the interstate
telephone network." 2
The PUCs appealed the Telerent decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In North Carolina Utility Commission v.
FCC (NCUC 1), 103 a divided court developed a two-prong test to resolve the
jurisdictional dispute revolving around sections 151 and 152(b) of the
Act." In interpreting the scope of section 152(b)'s limitation on federal
authority, the court first looked to the FCC's broad grant of jurisdiction
under section 151 of the Act and found that the Commission's jurisdiction
included "all instrumentalities, facilities [and] apparatus" incident to inter-
state communications. 0" The court, reconciling section 152(b)'s reservation
of state authority over intrastate matters with section 151's broad grant of
jurisdiction, looked to the Act's legislative history and found support for its
conclusion that the FCC "must remain free to determine what [CPE] can
... be interconnected with the interstate communications network."'" The
court then focused on section 152(b) and concluded that, based on the Act's
plain language, legislative history and previous Commission action, section
152(b) should not be interpreted as a sanction for any state regulation that
"in effect encroaches substantially upon the Commission's authority."'0 7 Of
100. Id. at 220.
101. Id. at 215. The FCC based its authority to regulate an interstate carrier's interconnec-
tion policy on its federal mandate. Under the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-205
(1988), Congress commanded the FCC to ensure that carriers followed "just and reasonable"
practices. The FCC interpreted the Communications Act in Telerent: "[T]he Commission's
powers to regulate interstate and foreign communications services are comprehensive and per-
vasive and embrace the terms and conditions under which customers shall be reasonably per-
mitted to use their own equipment in connection with such services." 45 F.C.C.2d at 217.
102. Id. at 215.
103. 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976).
104. Stahl, Note, supra note 5, at 529-32. Commentators agree that NCUC I articulated a
two-prong test to resolve jurisdictional disputes arising under the Communications Act. See
Haring and Levitz, supra note 64, at 299 (discussing fourth circuit's development of two-prong
preemption test); Bewig, supra note 70, at 1198 (discussing both prongs of NCUCI preemption
test).
105. 537 F.2d at 791 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)).
106. Id. at 793.
107. Id.
[Vol. 40:893
California v. FCC
special importance is the fact the court found that section 152(b) only pre-
served exclusive state control over matters "that in their nature and effect
[were] separable from and [did] not substantially affect the conduct or devel-
opment of interstate communications."'' 0 8 Affirming the FCC's preemptive
order, the court noted that because most CPE was used for both interstate
and intrastate communications," it was impossible to separate into inter-
state and intrastate components. Accordingly, the court reasoned that a
state's equipment policies necessarily affected interstate communications.'
Because state regulation of CPE had a substantial impact on interstate com-
munications, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the Commission had properly
preempted state regulations barring interconnection of CPE."I "
The Fourth Circuit's two-prong "inseparability/substantial impact" test
broadened the scope of Commission authority over intrastate communica-
tions. "' Under this two-prong test, the FCC could preempt state regulation
of an intrastate matter, despite section 152(b), if the intrastate portion of the
service/facility was inseparable from the interstate portion and the state reg-
ulation substantially affected interstate communications.11 3
C. Competition in the Enhanced Services Market
After preempting state regulations it feared would inhibit competition and
interconnection in the CPE market, the FCC began using its authority pur-
suant to section 151 to preempt state regulations of enhanced services. In
Computer 11,114 the FCC concluded that "consistent with our overall statu-
tory mandate, enhanced services should not be regulated under the Act,"" 5
108. Id.
109. Id. at 792.
110. Id. at 793.
Ill. Id.
112. See Bewig, supra note 70, at 1198 (noting that NCUC I recognized the FCC's expan-
sive powers).
113. 537 F.2d at 793; see Richard McKenna, Preemption Reversed: The Supreme Court's
Decision in Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 43, 46 (1987).
114. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. After finding that technology rendered its
Computer I definitions of regulated and non-regulated services impracticable because they re-
quired the FCC to determine the service's status on a case by case basis, the FCC commenced
Computer II. The FCC intended to change Computer I's regulatory scheme to provide greater
"certainty and practicability of regulation" and to enhance competition in the enhanced serv-
ices industry. See Computer & Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 206
(D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983); see also Computer II Notice of Inquiry,
supra note 26, at 107.
In Computer II, the FCC retained its Computer I maximum corporate separation require-
ments for AT&T and the BOCs. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 26, at 385.
115. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 26, at 428.
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and should remain unregulated by the states." 6 The FCC stated, "[W]e
have determined that the provision of enhanced services is not a common
carrier public utility offering and that efficient utilization and full exploita-
tion of the interstate telecommunications network would best be achieved if
these services are free from public utility-type regulation." '
In the 1982 Computer & Communications Industry Ass'n v. FCC
(CCIA) .8 decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit upheld the Commission's preemption of state regulation of
enhanced services and CPE.'19 CCIA essentially affirmed the FCC's deregu-
latory scheme set out in Computer 11.120
Petitioners, primarily state PUCs, made two arguments. First, they con-
tended the Commission erred in concluding it could deregulate enhanced
services and CPE. 2' Petitioners argued that Title II of the Act required the
FCC to regulate carrier-provided enhanced services and CPE.122 Second,
petitioners contended the FCC had invaded the states' ratemaking
authority. 123
After explaining that the primary issue was whether the FCC had imper-
missibly deregulated enhanced services and CPE,1 24 the court sustained the
FCC's deregulation on two grounds. First, the court decided that the FCC's
conclusion that enhanced services and CPE were not common carrier offer-
ings was reasonable and well substantiated. 25 The court noted that the Act
does not conclusively define common carrier, leaving the FCC some latitude
in determining what is and is not a common carrier service subject to regula-
tion. 126 The court recalled National Ass'n of Regulatory Commissioners v.
FCC (NAR UC 1)127 in which the Fourth Circuit defined common carrier as
an entity which indiscriminately offered service to the public for hire.128 Be-
116. Computer II Further Reconsideration Order, supra note 26, at 541.
117. Id. at 541 n.34.
118. 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (affirming FCC deregulation of CPE and enhanced
services because they were inseparable from and substantially affected the conduct and devel-
opment of interstate communications), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983). Two circuits, in
addition to the Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits, have relied on the FCC's NCUC I
two-prong test. See New York Tel. Co. v. FCC, 631 F.2d 1059, 1066 (2d Cir. 1980); Puerto
Rico Tel. Co. v. FCC, 553 F.2d 694, 699-700 (1st Cir. 1977).
119. 693 F.2d at 220.
120. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
121. 693 F.2d at 206.
122. Id. at 209-12.
123. Id. at 206.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 209-12.
126. Id. at 209-10.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 214; see also supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 40:893
California v. FCC
cause enhanced services and CPE are offered on an individual, contractual
basis, the court agreed that they are not common carrier offerings and that
the FCC could deregulate them. 129
Secondly, the court evaluated the FCC's preemption of state regulation of
enhanced services and CPE by reviewing the FCC's jurisdiction under the
Act. 30 The court interpreted section 151 of the Act broadly, finding that it
mandated the FCC to create a rapid and efficient nationwide telecommuni-
cation network.1 3 ' The court found that the FCC's goal of creating a fully
competitive market would be frustrated by inconsistent state regulation of
enhanced services and CPE. Consequently, the court sustained Computer
IPs preemption.'
32
D. Depreciation Rates and the Demise of the Two-Prong Test
In Virginia State Corp. Commission v. FCC, 3 3 the Fourth Circuit again
applied its two-prong preemption test to uphold FCC preemption' 34 of in-
consistent state regulation of depreciation charges.' 35 The court decided
that although section 152(b) reserved regulation of intrastate communica-
129. 693 F.2d at 209-10,218.
130. Id. at 207, 214-15.
131. Id. at 207.
132. Id.
133. 737 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nor. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC,
476 U.S. 355 (1986).
134. In 1980 and 1981, the FCC issued two orders which instituted new depreciation and
accounting regulations that facilitated more rapid capital recovery. Stahl, Note, supra note 5,
at 533 (citing Amendment of Part 31, Uniform System of Accounts for Class A and Class B
Telephone Companies, 85 F.C.C.2d 818, 820 (1981) (Expensing Order) (providing that inside
wiring would not be treated as a depreciable capital investment, but would be charged to
current users); Amendment of Part 31, Uniform System of Accounts for Class A and Class B
Telephone Companies, 83 F.C.C.2d 267, 271 (1980) (Depreciation Order) (mandating equal
life and remaining life methods of depreciation)).
The rate at which physical plants and facilities depreciate determines the rate at which a
carrier can recover its capital investment. McKenna, supra note 113, at 46. Traditionally,
carriers used the "vintage group" method of depreciation. Stahl, Note, supra note 5, at 534
n. 109. Using this method, one places all the assets which are put into service in the same year
into a "vintage group." Id. A uniform dollar amount is then depreciated for each period the
asset is used. Id. The "equal life" method, however, divides the vintage group into subcatego-
ries of assets which have the same service life. Id. Obviously, regulators favor long service
lives because this helps keep rates low by spreading costs out over time. Id.
135. See Amendment of Part 31, Uniform System of Accounts for Class A and B Tele-
phone Companies, 89 F.C.C.2d 1094 (1982) (Accounting Methods), rev'd, 92 F.C.C.2d 864
(1983) [hereinafter Preemption Decision], aff'd sub nom. Virginia State Corp. Comm'n v.
FCC, 737 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476
U.S. 355 (1986).
In January 1983, the FCC issued an order which preempted state regulation of depreciation
charges inconsistent with rates set by the FCC. Preemption Decision, supra, at 879.
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tions to the states, sections 152(b) and 221(b) 13 6 had to be interpreted in
light of section 151's mandate that the FCC develop an efficient nationwide
telecommunication network.
37
After applying the inseparability prong of the NCUC I test,' 3 and finding
that it was physically possible to separate interstate depreciation methods
from intrastate methods, the court nevertheless concluded that the possibil-
ity of physical separation did not preclude the Commission from preempting
the state regulation.' 39 Applying the second prong of the NCUC I test, the
court found that state depreciation regulations had a substantial impact on
the development of interstate communications.'" ° The court agreed with the
FCC's determination that slow capital recovery,14 1 mandated by state regu-
lations, would hinder competition and technological innovation. 142 The
court held that because inconsistent state regulation of depreciation rates
prevented rapid development of interstate facilities, the FCC was justified in
preempting the regulation despite being able to separate the depreciation
rates into their intrastate and interstate components. 43
Judge Widener dissented from the majority's affirmation of FCC preemp-
tion.i4 He interpreted section 152(b) as an explicit reservation of state au-
thority over local rates. 145  Judge Widener argued that the majority's
decision would allow the Commission to freely preempt state regulation,
contrary to the Act's provisions. "6
Dissatisfied with the Fourth Circuit's affirmation of the Commission's pre-
emption, petitioners requested certiorari from the Supreme Court.
136. Section 221(b) of the Act provides the Commission with the authority to prescribe
depreciation schedules for common carriers. 47 U.S.C. § 221(b) (1988).
137. 737 F.2d at 392.
138. See Stahl, Note, supra note 5, at 542. Some commentators have noted that the Fourth
Circuit misapplied its own test by relying exclusively on the test's second prong. Because the
court and the FCC both found that depreciation rates were reducible to intrastate and inter-
state components, the court had to rely exclusively on the test's second prong to uphold the
preemption. Virginia State, 737 F.2d at 392.
139. 737 F.2d at 392.
140. Id. at 396.
141. See Preemption Decision, supra note 135, at 876. The FCC found that phone compa-
nies needed faster capital recovery rates to encourage technological innovation and help them
compete with new entrants into the market. Id.
142. 737 F.2d at 394.
143. Id. at 396.
144. Id. at 398.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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III. LOUISIANA PSC: SHAKING THE FOUNDATION OF FCC PREEMPTION
In Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC (Louisiana PSC), 147 the
Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision in Virginia State
Corp., holding instead that the language, structure, and legislative history of
section 152(b) best supported an interpretation of that section as prohibiting
the FCC from requiring state commissions to follow FCC depreciation prac-
tices for intrastate ratemaking purposes.14 8
The Commission first argued that it had sole regulatory authority over
depreciation rates pursuant to sections 151 and 220 of the Act. 49 The Com-
mission then argued that inconsistent state depreciation methods, which
tended to favor a slow rate of depreciation, prohibited the FCC from fulfil-
ling its policy of creating a competitive telephone industry.15
0
Contrary to the FCC's expansive interpretation of section 151, the Court
interpreted the section as only lending "some support" to the FCC's argu-
ment that state regulations which frustrated Commission attempts to create
a rapid and efficient nationwide phone network were "impliedly barred by
the Act."'' The Court agreed with the state PUCs that sections 151 and
152(b) created a dual regulatory system, splitting the jurisdictional burden
between the states and federal government. '5 2 The Court thereupon rejected
the FCC's argument that section 152(b) was only intended to protect the
state PUCs' authority to set individual customer charges for specific intra-
state services.' 53 The Court also rejected the FCC's argument that section
152(b) was only intended to prevent the Commission from setting local rates,
as the ICC had done in Shreveport.'5 4 By rejecting the Commission's inter-
pretation of the purpose and scope of section 152(b), the Supreme Court
implicitly rejected the basis and rationale for upholding FCC preemption
relied on in CCIA and NCUC 1.155 Recall that both courts of appeals' deci-
147. 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
148. Id. at 359. For a detailed analysis of the Louisiana PSC opinion, see Bewig, supra
note 70.
149. Id. at 362. Section 220 of the Act requires the FCC to prescribe depreciation rates for
common carriers. 47 U.S.C. § 220 (1988).
150. 476 U.S. at 363; see also supra note 134.
151. Id at 370.
152. Id. at 371.
153. Id. The Court characterized the FCC's interpretation of section 152(b) as a "narrow
reading," not supported by the common industry practice of using the term "charges" to refer
to depreciation methods. Id.
154. Id. at 372. The FCC successfully argued in a number of cases that section 152(b)'s
legislative history supported its argument that the section was adopted only to preserve state
control over setting local rates. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
155. The Court did not directly overrule CCIA and NCUC I. Instead, the opinion rejects
the lower courts' interpretation of the purpose and meaning of section 152(b).
1991]
Catholic University Law Review
sions had agreed with the FCC's interpretation of section 152(b) as only
being a precautionary measure, enacted to prevent the application of a
Shreveport-type decision in the telecommunication field. 56
In addition to casting a shadow over the court of appeals' interpretations
of the scope and purpose of section 152(b) in NCUC I, CCA, and Virginia
State Corp., the Court also discounted the inseparability prong of NCUC I's
preemption test. The Court emphasized the role of section 410(c) of the
Act, 157 pointing out that this section provides the means for regulators to
separate a combined service or facility into its intrastate and interstate com-
ponents. 5 ' The Court held that section 410(c)'s separation process pre-
cluded the FCC from using an inseparability argument to justify preemption
of state depreciation methods.' 59
The Louisiana PSC Court clearly set forth the scope of FCC preemption
with respect to regulation of depreciation rates, but left unanswered ques-
tions regarding the scope of FCC preemption in other areas. Given the
Court's expansive reading of section 152(b), the entire decision may be inter-
preted as an outright ban on FCC preemption of any intrastate matter. In
footnote four, however, Justice Brennan provided the Commission with a
possible basis for preemption by pointing out that cases involving regulation
of depreciation rates are "readily distinguishable from those [cases] in which
FCC pre-emption of state regulation was upheld where it was not possible to
separate the interstate and the intrastate components of the asserted FCC
regulation" and the state regulation, therefore, made it impossible for the
FCC to achieve a valid federal goal." ° Three cases decided since Louisiana
156. See supra notes 106-08, 130-32, 135-37.
157. 476 U.S. at 374. The FCC argued that section 152(b) did not ban federal regulation of
depreciation charges for intrastate ratemaking purposes because
the plant involved ... is used interchangeably to provide both interstate and intra-
state service, and... [section 152(b)] should be "confined to intrastate matters which
are 'separable from and do not substantially affect' interstate communications."...
[T]he refusal of the States to employ accurate measures of depreciation will have a
severe impact on the interstate communications network.
Id. at 373 (citation omitted); see McKenna, supra note 113, at 49.
158. Section 410(c) of the Act provides: "[t]he Commission shall refer any proceeding
regarding the jurisdictional separation of common carrier property and expenses between in-
terstate and intrastate operations .... to a Federal-State Joint Board." 47 U.S.C. § 410(c)
(1982); see also Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930) (the Supreme Court men-
tioned, for the first time, separating interstate and intrastate facilities and services as a means
of resolving jurisdictional disputes), conformed to, Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Gilbert, 3 F. Supp.
595 (D. Ill. 1933), rev'd sub nom. Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151 (1934).
159. 476 U.S. at 369.
160. Id. at 375 n.4 (emphasis in original). The Court then cites NCUC II, explaining in a
parenthetical that the "FCC acted within its authority to permit subscribers to provide their
own telephones .... Id.
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PSC have helped reconcile footnote four with the body of the Court's opin-
ion and the body of case law upholding FCC preemption.
IV. PREEMPTION DESPITE LOUISIANA PSC: THE
APPELLATE COURT TRILOGY
Three United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
decisions have interpreted Louisiana PSC as recognizing an impossibility ex-
ception to section 152(b) and have upheld FCC preemption of state regula-
tion. In National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC
(NAR UC I1), '6 the court held that the FCC could preempt state regulation
when the state regulation "negated" an FCC regulation.1 62 In NAR UC III,
after reviewing an FCC order which preempted state regulation of the instal-
lation and maintenance of inside wiring,1 63 the court decided that even
under Louisiana PSC the FCC could preempt state regulations of an intra-
state matter. 164 Specifically, the court noted that legitimate state regulation
of intrastate telephone service could in fact interfere with the Commission
fulfilling its goal of creating a competitive inside wiring market. 1 65 Accord-
ingly, the court held that the FCC can preempt state regulation of inside
wiring to the extent that the state regulation negates the federal policy of
creating a competitive inside wiring market.1 66
The court used this same analysis in upholding FCC preemption in Illinois
Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC.'6 7 In Illinois Bell, five BOCs challenged an FCC
order preempting state regulation of marketing services, such as Centrex,
which the BOCs claimed were purely intrastate.1 61 Illinois Bell contended
161. 880 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
162. Id. at 429.
163. "Inside wiring" consists of the telephone wires located on the customer's end of the
connection between the customer and the phone company inside a customer's home or busi-
ness. California v FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1241 n.37 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting NARUC II, 880
F.2d at 425). The FCC's "preemption" amounted to a requirement that the states unbundle
inside wiring from basic transmission service. See Detariffing the Installation and Mainte-
nance of Inside Wiring, 1 F.C.C.R. 1190, 1192 (1986).
164. 880 F.2d at 429.
165. Id. at 430.
166. Id. at 431. The court actually remanded part of the FCC's preemption order. Peti-
tioners argued that if the FCC unbundled inside wiring charges from basic service charges,
customers could find alternative inside wiring providers, thereby promoting a competitive in-
side wiring market. Id. at 429-30. The court remanded the preemptive order because the
Commission failed to prove that even if it did unbundle charges for inside wiring from basic
service charges, the state regulations it wanted to preempt would still have thwarted the FCC's
goal of a competitive inside wiring market.
167. 883 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
168. Id. at 108. Centrex is a tariffed service sold by local phone companies. National
Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC (NARUC II), 737 F.2d 1095, 1122 (D.C. Cir.
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that because the FCC's preemptive order would inevitably affect charges for
intrastate communication services, the FCC had exceeded its jurisdiction
under Louisiana PSC.169
The court disagreed with Illinois Bell's characterization of Centrex as a
purely intrastate service, and instead agreed with the FCC's finding that
Centrex "support[s] interstate as well as intrastate communications.,' 70 In
upholding the FCC's preemptive order, however, the court stated that before
it could preempt, the FCC had to show that it could not separate the service
into its interstate and intrastate components.' 7'
Finally, in Public Utilities Commission of Texas v. FCC (ARCO), 172 the
court reviewed an FCC order which preempted an order issued by the Texas
Public Utilities Commission (Texas PUC). 73 The Texas PUC order prohib-
ited a customer, who operated an FCC-licensed microwave communication
network, from choosing his point of interconnection with the public
switched network. 174
Southwest, a Bell Operating Company, is the state certified telephone mo-
nopoly for the area including Dallas, Texas. 17' GTE Southwest, the wholly
owned subsidiary of GTE Corporation, has an exclusive state franchise for
an area including Plano, Texas. 176 In 1983, ARCO leased trunk lines from
Southwest to carry communications from Plano to points beyond Plano.177
The Texas PUC prohibited Southwest from leasing trunks to ARCO because
the Texas Public Utility Regulatory Act 78 prohibited public utilities from
serving, either directly or indirectly, a facility within another utility's
franchise area.' 7' The FCC, which regarded ARCO's private microwave
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1985). Centrex offers communications functions such as
"intercom calling, conference calling, direct inward dialing, and automatically identified out-
ward dialing." Id.
169. 883 F.2d at 112.
170. Id. at 114.
171. Id. at 114-15.
172. 886 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
173. Id. For a detailed analysis of the ARCO decision, see Bewig, supra note 70. See also
Haring Levitz, supra note 64 (discussing D.C. Circuit's interpretation and application of Loui-
siana PSC in Arco).
174. Customers who have a private network still need access to the public network so as to
interconnect their private branch exchange (PBX) switchboard to the local telephone com-
pany. 886 F.2d at 1328. Recall that a PBX is a customer-provided switch that automatically
transfers, or switches, calls between the customer's private telephone station and other
locations.
175. Id. at 1327.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1446(c), § 50 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1989).
179. 886 F.2d at 1328-29.
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system as a type of customer equipment,' 80 preempted the Texas PUC's or-
der, arguing that the case involved state regulations that conflicted with a
customer's right to interconnect to the publicly switched interstate network
in a way that was privately beneficial without being publicly detrimental . '8
The court upheld the FCC's preemption. The court explained that in Louisi-
ana PSC, the "Court implicitly recognized... that the FCC may ... pre-
empt conflicting state rules where the FCC cannot 'separate the interstate
and the intrastate components of [its] asserted . ..regulation.' ,182 The
court concluded that the FCC had met its burden of showing that the state
regulation made it impossible for the FCC to fulfill its goal of making inter-
state communications fully competitive. 183
Thus, according to NAR UC III, Illinois Bell, and ARCO, the FCC can
preempt state regulation of an intrastate matter if the state regulation makes
it impossible for the FCC to promote a federal policy. Although these three
appeals court cases clarify the scope of FCC preemption of state regulation
of inside wiring, 18 CPE interconnection 8 5 and telephone services, 1 6 ques-
tions remain concerning the scope of the Commission's authority to preempt
state regulation of enhanced services.
V. CALIFORNIA V. FCC: PREEMPTION PREEMPTED
In 1986, the Commission commenced Computer jj, 187 its third attempt
to develop an effective regulatory structure for the provision of enhanced
services. In Computer III, the Commission concluded that it would be in the
public interest to permit AT&T and the BOCs to integrate their basic and
enhanced services. 188 The FCC also decided that more stringent structural
separation requirements imposed by the states would interfere with its pro-
competitive policies and that facilities used by common carriers to provide
basic and enhanced services could not practicably be separated into their
180. Id. at 1330.
181. Atlantic Richfield Co., 3 F.C.C.R. 3089, 3092 (1988).
182. 886 F.2d at 1331 (quoting Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 375
n.4 (1986) (alterations and omissions made by court)).
183. Id. at 1335.
184. See National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC (NARUC III), 737 F.2d
1095 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1985); see also supra notes 161-64, 169 and
accompanying text.
185. See Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 883 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also supra notes
97-119, 171 and accompanying text.
186. See Public Util. Comm'n v. FCC (ARCO), 886 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also
supra notes 118-36, 176 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
188. Computer III Phase I Order, supra note 37, at 428-30, paras. 114-18.
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intrastate and interstate components.' 8 9 Accordingly, the FCC preempted
state regulations imposing structural separation requirements or inconsistent
nonstructural safeguards on the enhanced service operations of AT&T and
the BOCs.' 90 The FCC also preempted states from imposing structural sep-
aration requirements or nonstructural safeguards on the independent tele-
phone companies (ITCs) which were more stringent than those which the
Commission imposed on AT&T and the BOCs. t 9'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated and
remanded the FCC's Computer III preemption order. 192 In its decision, the
court addressed the pivotal issue of whether section 152(b) prohibits FCC
preemption of state regulation of enhanced services by distinguishing basic
from enhanced services.' 93 Recall that in both Computer II and Computer
III, the FCC premised its deregulation and resulting preemption on the fact
that enhanced services are not common carrier services.' 94 By finding that
section 152(b) does not differentiate between basic and enhanced services,
the Ninth Circuit undermined the basis for FCC preemption of state regula-
tion of enhanced services.
The FCC, by defining enhanced services as non-common carrier services
in Computer II, precluded the states from regulating such services pursuant
to section 152(b), which, per the FCC's interpretation, applies only to com-
mon carrier intrastate matters.195 Recall that the FCC argued in both Com-
puter I and Computer II that section 152(b)'s language, "for or in connection
with intrastate communication service by wire or radio of any carrier,"' 96
means that section 152(b) applies only to telecommunication services offered
on a common carrier basis' 97 because "carrier" is the same as "common
189. Computer III Phase I Reconsideration Order, supra note 37, at 3062, para. 188.
190. Id.
191. Computer III Phase II Order, supra note 37, at 3072, 3102, para 210.
192. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1246 (9th Cir. 1990).
193. Id. at 1239. This Note deals exclusively with the issue of the Commission's preemp-
tion of state regulation of the provision of enhanced services by common carriers. The opinion
treats two additional issues. First, the court decides that the FCC's decision to allow the
BOCs to integrate their unregulated and regulated services was arbitrary and capricious and,
therefore, violative of section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a)
(1988). Id. at 1230. Second, the court addresses the FCC's argument that the petitioner's
challenge to the Commission's preemptive order was barred by res judicata, because the court
in CCIA had already affirmed the FCC's preemptive authority. Id. at 1245. The court dis-
misses the Commission's argument as "misplaced." Id.
194. See supra notes 28-29, 117 and accompanying text.
195. See Computer II Final Decision, supra note 26, at 432 (explaining that enhanced serv-
ices, as opposed to basic services, are not regulated as common carrier services because they
are "custom tailor[ed] ... to the particularized needs of the [ ] individual customers").
196. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b)(1) (1988).
197. 905 F.2d at 1239-40.
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carrier" pursuant to the Act. 98 The FCC contended that because AT&T,
the BOCs and the ITCs do not offer enhanced services on a common carrier
basis,' 99 enhanced services are not subject to Title II common carrier regula-
tion and are therefore not reserved to the states for regulation pursuant to
section 152(b). 2"
The FCC argued, in the alternative, that its preemption orders fell within
the "impossibility" exception to section 152(b) which the Supreme Court
recognized in Louisiana PSC.20 ' The FCC maintained that its preemption
of state-imposed nonstructural safeguards was valid because state regulation
thwarted Computer liPs regulatory scheme, making it impossible for the
FCC to fulfill its goal of creating a fully competitive enhanced services
market. 20
2
On the other hand, state regulators argued that enhanced services are
services within section 152(b)'s reach, because enhanced services are "noth-
ing more than the transmission of electronic signals over the telephone net-
work,"2 3 and are therefore "indistinguishable from basic services." 2" They
also argued that the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of section 152(b),
as stated in Louisiana PSC, prohibits the FCC from regulating intrastate
basic and enhanced services.205
The Ninth Circuit rejected the FCC's interpretation of section 152(b),
characterizing it as a "cramped reading" of the Act.2°' After reciting lan-
guage from Louisiana PSC which interpreted section 152(b) as "fenc[ing] off
from FCC reach or regulation" services which are delivered by a telephone
carrier in connection with its intrastate common carrier telephone service,
207
the court pointed out that enhanced services, delivered by common carriers
on an intrastate basis over the telephone lines, fall within section 152(b)'s
broad category of services reserved to the states for regulation. 2 8 The court
went on to hold that because communication common carriers provide en-
hanced services over the intrastate telephone network, enhanced services are
common carrier services within the "regulatory domain of the states.
' 209
198. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1988) (equating "carrier" with "common carrier" for purposes of
the Act).
199. 905 F.2d at 1239-40.
200. Id. at 1240.
201. Id at 1242-43.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1239.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1240.
207. Id. (quoting Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 370 (1986)).
208. Id. at 1240.
209. Id.
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The court rejected the FCC's interpretation of section 152(b)'s "of any
carrier" language as meaning that the section does not apply to non-com-
mon carrier services.2 '0 The court noted that by its plain language, section
152(b) applies to communication services provided by common carriers such
as AT&T, as opposed to services provided by non-common carriers such as
IBM.2 ' The court pointed out that while the statute distinguishes between
types of providers, section 152(b) does not distinguish between the terms and
conditions of the services the carriers provide.2 2 The court stated that if it
adopted the FCC's interpretation of section 152(b)'s language and legislative
history,2 '1 3 the court would have to qualify the language "for or in connec-
tion with intrastate communication service" by adding "which the carrier
provides on a common carrier basis.",214 The court concluded that such a
change could only be made by Congress.21 5
The court also rejected the FCC's interpretation of section 152(b)'s legisla-
tive history.216 The FCC argued that the section's legislative history demon-
strates that section 152(b) only protects state jurisdiction over intrastate
charges for carrier-provided telephone services.217 The court, however, held
that despite evidence that Congress's primary concern in enacting section
152(b) of the Act was protecting state jurisdiction over setting intrastate
rates, "the language Congress chose reserved to the states expansive author-
ity to regulate intrastate telecommunications. ,218
The Ninth Circuit did agree with the FCC that Louisiana PSC requires
courts and regulators to recognize an "impossibility exception" to section
152(b). 21 9 The court cited both NAR UC 111220 and Illinois Bell 22 ' as deci-
210. Id. at 1240-41.
211. Id. at 1240.
212. Id. The court said, "IT]he distinction made by the statute is between providers of
communications services, i.e., between carriers and non-carriers. When services are provided
by communications carriers, the statute makes no distinction based upon the terms and condi-
tions on which the services are offered .... " Id. (emphasis in original).
213. The FCC interpreted the language as denoting a legal difference between services of-
fered on a common carrier basis and those offered on a non-common carrier basis. See id. The
FCC interpreted the statute as distinguishing between the manner in which the service was
offered, not between who offered it. Id. (emphasis added).
214. Id. at 1242.
215. Id. at 1241.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. (quoting Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 372-73 (1986)); see
also supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (offering ample evidence that section 152(b) was
adopted in response to the Shreveport decision which allowed the ICC to set local shipping
rates).
219. 905 F.2d at 1243.
220. 880 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
221. 883 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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sions based on the Louisiana PSC principle that the FCC can preempt if the
state regulation makes it impossible for the FCC to implement its policies.222
The court noted, however, that the impossibility exception is a narrow one,
requiring the FCC to argue with "some specificity" that the state regulation
negates the FCC's regulation.22 3 The court went on to define Louisiana
PSC's "some specificity" language as meaning that the FCC has to "justify[]
its entire preemption order by demonstrating that the order is narrowly tai-
lored to preempt only such state regulations as would negate valid FCC reg-
ulatory goals.",224 After reviewing the record, the court held that Computer
III's orders preempting state structural safeguards and inconsistent non-
structural safeguards were not limited to state regulation which would "nec-
essarily thwart or impede" valid FCC goals. 225
VI. IMPACT OF CALIFORNIA v. FCC
California v. FCC has created a new preemption test--one which severely
limits the Commission's authority to regulate enhanced services simultane-
ously provided on an intrastate and interstate basis. Thus, it substantially
curtails the FCC's section 151 authority to create a rapid and efficient na-
tionwide telecommunication network. 226  According to California v. FCC,
the FCC can preempt state regulation, but only if- (a) the facility or service
222. 905 F.2d at 1242-43.
223. Id. at 1243.
224. Id. (emphasis in original).
225. Id. The FCC, in support of its policy of permitting common carriers to freely choose
whether to integrate or separate their interstate operations, argued that any state requirement
that a carrier separate its intrastate enhanced service and intrastate basic service will necessar-
ily force the carriers to separate the interstate service from intrastate service, since intrastate
and interstate portions of enhanced services are "structurally inseparable." See Computer III
Phase I Reconsideration Order, supra note 37, at 3062.
The court pointed out that this regulatory scheme, i.e., prohibiting states from requiring
structural separation for the provision of enhanced services, failed because the FCC had not
considered the possibility that enhanced services, such as alarm services, could be offered on a
purely local basis. The court faulted the FCC for not explaining how the "structural separa-
tion of such purely intrastate enhanced services from basic telephone service would interfere in
any way with a carrier's ability to provide interstate enhanced services ... on an integrated
basis." 905 F.2d at 1244 (emphasis in original).
Regarding the FCC's preemption of states' regulations requiring inconsistent or more re-
strictive non-structural safeguards, the court faulted the FCC for not demonstrating why a
state regulation requiring a common carrier to offer intrastate enhanced services through a
separate corporate subsidiary would frustrate the FCC's goal of allowing common carriers the
freedom to choose whether to integrate or separate their interstate operations. Id. at 1244-45.
226. Richard E. Wiley & Howard D. Polsky, New Turmoil in Telecommunications Policy,
Legal Times, Sept. 10, 1990, at 28, col. 1. Former FCC Commissioner, Richard Wiley, partner
in the D.C. law firm Wiley, Rein & Fielding, says that this limit to FCC authority could
"seriously impede the uniform deployment of enhanced services in this country." Id.
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cannot be separated into its interstate and intrastate components; and,
(b) the regulation necessarily thwarts the FCC in implementing a federal
policy. Whereas the Supreme Court in Louisiana PSC merely required the
FCC to show, based on the record before it, that the state regulation pre-
vented the FCC from promoting a valid FCC goal,227 the Ninth Circuit test
requires the FCC to prove that it has tailored its entire order so that it
preempts only those state regulations which thwart its goals. 228 This bur-
dens the FCC with proving that the state regulation conflicts with the fed-
eral regulation in any scenario.229 The administrative burdens inherent in
this task will be overwhelming and prohibitive.23 °
California v. FCC has had the immediate effect of prompting the Commis-
sion to initiate two rulemaking proceedings to compile a record upon which
to base its decision to eliminate structural separation requirements for the
BOCs.231  Also, according to FCC Chairman Alfred Sikes, the FCC has de-
cided to handle the preemption issue on an ad hoc basis. In a statement
made immediately following the court's decision, Chairman Sikes an-
nounced that the FCC intends "to act only where we believe there is im-
proper encroachment on interstate communications, and frustration of
industry's ability to offer services nationwide., 23 2
In addition to imposing administrative burdens, California v. FCC sent the
BOCs and enhanced service providers (ESPs) into a tailspin. 233 Until the
non-structural safeguard issue is settled, BOCs which began integrating en-
hanced and basic services pursuant to Computer III must develop separate
227. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
228. 905 F.2d at 1243-44.
229. Kathleen Killette, Bells Await Action, COMM. WEEK Oct. 29, 1990, at 2. At a confer-
ence sponsored by the Federal Communications Bar Association to discuss California v. FCC's
impact, Attorney Thomas Sugrue, deputy assistant secretary for communications and informa-
tion at the National Telecommunications and Information Agency, said that pursuant to Cali-
fornia v. FCC, the Commission would have to prove "service by service and state by state, that
state rules conflict with federal policy." Id.
230. Kathleen Killette, How to Regulate?, COMM. WEEK Nov. 11, 1990, at 13, 56.
231. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Computer III Remand Proceeding, 5 F.C.C.R.
5242, 5242 (1990) (the FCC proposed "(1) to reinstate Open Network Architecture (ONA)
obligations on the Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) and the American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company (AT&T); (2) to permit AT&T to provide collocated enhanced services on an
integrated basis pursuant to the nonstructural safeguards adopted in Computer III; and (3) to
reinstate certain Computer III decisions regarding Network Channel Terminating Equipment
(NCTE)"); Report and Order, 5 F.C.C.R. 7719, 7719-20 (1990) (adopting the proposals con-
tained in the NPRM).
232. Chairman Alfred C. Sikes, Statements in FCC Press Release 4 (July 9, 1990).
233. Killette, supra note 230, at 13. IBM, Lexis and Westlaw are just three examples of
ESPs.
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business and marketing strategies under which they can offer the services.234
Before the BOCs and ESPs can fully develop and implement these new busi-
ness plans, however, they must wait for word from the different PUCs to see
what new and different state regulations require their compliance. States
that do not quickly issue new regulations will cause substantial delay in the
deployment of new, innovative enhanced services.
Apart from increasing the cost of doing business for ESPs and developing
a more burdensome preemption test for the FCC, California v. FCC renders
twenty years of Commission rulemaking moot, jeopardizing the creation of a
coherent, unified competitive enhanced services market.2 35 FCC Chairman
Sikes fears that the decision will result in a " 'crazy quilt' of regulations,"
producing "[u]ndesirable geographic and customer inequities. ' , 236
By characterizing the FCC's distinction between enhanced and basic serv-
ices as a "cramped reading,,2 37 the court in California v. FCC ignored the
detailed rulemaking proceedings begun in 1968 with Computer /23' Rather
than examining the basis for the FCC's Computer I and Computer II techni-
cal and legal distinctions between enhanced and basic services,239 the Ninth
Circuit simply adopted the petitioner's characterization of enhanced services
as nothing more than electronic signals passing over a telephone wire. 2 ° In
fact, the court ignored the D.C. Circuit's lengthy and detailed opinion in
CCIA which discussed and then affirmed the FCC's distinctions between ba-
sic and enhanced services.241 The court also ignored the Fourth Circuit's
decision in NAR UC 1242 where that court held that a service's status as com-
mon or non-common carrier depended on how the service was provided, not
on the identity of the provider.2 43 In fact, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion
that section 152(b) distinguishes between providers of services 2 " stands in
234. The BOCs can continue offering enhanced services on an integrated basis under com-
parably efficient interconnection (CEI) plans filed prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision. Kil-
lette, supra note 229, at 2.
235. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that
when an agency replaces an existing rule with a new one, and a court vacates all or part of the
new rule, the effect is to reinstate the rule previously in force. Action on Smoking and Health
v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 713 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
236. Chairman Alfred C. Sikes, Statements in FCC Press Release 5 (July 9, 1990).
237. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1240 (9th Cir. 1990).
238. See supra notes 9-21 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 4, 28-29 and accompanying text.
240. 905 F.2d at 1242.
241. 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983); see supra notes 31,
118 and accompanying text.
242. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976).
243. See id. at 640-42.
244. 905 F.2d at 1240.
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marked contrast to the NAR UC I opinion and the numerous FCC decisions
incorporating its reasoning.
Fearing a reality like the one described by Chairman Sikes, ESPs filed a
petition for declaratory ruling with the FCC, asking that the Commission
declare that the states and the District of Columbia are preempted from
imposing entry and exit regulation and tariff requirements on carrier affili-
ated and noncarrier affiliated enhanced service providers.245 The ESPs filed
their petition in response to actions taken by the Florida,24 6 Delaware24 7 and
District of Columbia2 41 public utility commissions to impose very different
and limiting entry or exit regulations on both carrier and non-carrier
ESPs. 249 According to the ESPs, the regulations threaten the flourishing
and competitive enhanced service market which developed under the FCC's
control.2 5 °
245. See Petition for Declaratory Ruling That States and the District of Columbia Are
Preempted From Imposing Entry and Exit Regulation and Tariff Requirements on Carrier
Affiliated and Noncarrier Affiliated Enhanced Service Providers (FCC filed Feb. 11, 1991)
[hereinafter D.C. Petition for Declaratory Ruling].
246. Florida Public Service Commission, An Investigation Into Statewide Offering of Ac-
cess to the Local Network for the Purpose of Providing Information Services, Docket 880423-
TP, Order No. 21815 (Sept. 5, 1989) [hereinafter Florida PSC Investigation].
247. Public Service Commission of the State of Delaware, The Application of the Diamond
State Telephone Company for the Establishment of Regulations and Rates for Answer Call
Service, PSC Docket No. 90-34T, Order No. 3215 (Nov. 2, 1990) [hereinafter Diamond
Application].
248. Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia, Order to Show Cause, Formal
Case No. 904, Investigation of Regulation of Enhanced Services, Order No. 9573 (Oct. 31,
1990) [hereinafter D.C. Show Cause Order].
249. See Public Notice for Petition for Declaratory Ruling, DA 91-223 (released Feb. 22,
1991). The D.C. Commission issued an Order to Show Cause on October 31, 1990, concluding
that it would regulate the provision of enhanced services in the District of Columbia. See D.C.
Show Cause Order, supra note 248. The D.C. Commission proposed to regulate services pro-
vided by carriers as well as services provided by independent ESPs. See D.C. Petition for
Declaratory Ruling, supra note 245, at 10. The D.C. Show Cause Order concluded, inter alia,
that the D.C. Public Utility Commission had jurisdiction over particular enhanced services
even when they were offered over interstate lines as long as "intra-District traffic [was] trans-
mitted." D.C. Show Cause Order, supra note 248, at 2.
The Florida Public Service Commission (PSC) issued an order in September in which it
concluded that particular enhanced services offered by local exchange carriers and independ-
ent ESPs are public utility services subject to state tariff regulation. See Florida PSC Investiga-
tion, supra note 246. One of the most alarming portions of the Florida PSC Investigation is
that the Commission expanded its definition of "intrastate" services to include services trans-
mitted from an ESPs' point of presence in Florida to the point of termination/origination in
Florida regardless of whether the service is being used to originate/terminate an interstate
enhanced service. Id. at 27. The Delaware Public Service Commission issued an order No-
vember 2, 1990 allowing a tariff to become temporarily effective for a formerly unregulated
enhanced service. See Diamond Application, supra note 247.
250. See D.C. Petition for Declaratory Ruling, supra note 245, at 9.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Once again, the Commission's quest for a fully competitive telecommuni-
cation market has drawn the states and the FCC into a jurisdictional battle.
This time, the tension has split the circuits, leaving all parties concerned
with little guidance as to how to proceed. For several reasons, California v.
FCC effectively increases the degree of difficulty inherent in the FCC's pur-
suit of a competitive telecommunication market. First, this decision does
not defer to the Commission's rulemaking in Computer I and Computer II,
as the Fourth Circuit did in NCUC I and NCUC H and as the D.C. Circuit
did in CCIA. Unable to classify enhanced services as "non-common carrier
offerings," the Commission must rework twenty years of rulemaking. In ef-
fect, this decision has placed the Commission in the same position it was in
1968, when it commenced Computer I, lacking effective control over com-
mon carrier entry into the data processing field so as to protect phone cus-
tomers from increased rates and, at the same time, promote full and fair
competition in a burgeoning industry. Second, the Ninth Circuit requires
the FCC to make a specific showing that the state regulation necessarily
thwarts the FCC, in every instance, from fulfilling its policies. This places a
tremendous evidentiary burden on the Commission, one the FCC may have
to fight long and hard to prove every time a state passes a prohibitive regula-
tion. Third, because this decision interprets section 152(b) as a broad re-
striction on Commission authority to preempt state public utility regulation,
the FCC now finds itself equipped with limited means to effectuate a tremen-
dous task--developing a rapid and efficient nationwide telecommunication
network. Perhaps the time has come for the Supreme Court to definitively
set forth the scope of the FCC's jurisdiction.
Carolyn Whitworth Malanga
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